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Introduction
Under the Obama Administration, Congress had passed The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare that was signed into law by President Obama on
March 23, 2010. The federal statute implicates a robust expansion of healthcare coverage in
which the major provisions of the law came into effect in 2014. The ACA does not have a
bipartisan backing, that is why it has been a major topic in the past two Presidential elections in
2012 as well as in 2016. The ACA has also undergone a constitutional crisis which has led up all
the way to the Supreme Court. The ACA imposed a health insurance mandate in which most
taxpayers in the U.S must hold a health insurance plan or otherwise face a tax penalty that could
cost up to $650 per adult and $347 per child. After much debate, the Supreme Court has ruled
the individual mandate provision as constitutional with the reason that the Constitution gives the
ability for Congress to exercise to regulate commerce.
Since the implementation of the ACA, there have been numerous studies that pertain to
how the plan affected health insurance nationally in terms of premiums, coverage and subsidies.
With President Obama finishing up his last term, the 2016 Presidential election revolved around
the issue of healthcare. Then candidate Donald Trump, was a loud supporter of repealing and
replacing the ACA. Once Trump became President, the fight over repealing and replacing the
law came with great difficulty. Ultimately, Congress had enough votes to repeal a portion of the
ACA; the individual mandate as part of the tax reform legislation passed in December of 2017.
The tax penalty for those that do not have health insurance coverage is now gone and the topic of
debate is not whether it was constitutional or political, but how it affected the healthcare market
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of individuals. Did the mandate positively affect a sector of the healthcare market that had the
ability before to choose whether to have insurance or not?
Methodology and Research Question
This paper dives into the effect of the withdrawal of the individual mandate that was set
in law in 2011 then repealed at the end of 2017 on individuals who are self-employed. Did the
individual mandate incentivise self-employers to buy insurance? This paper will not cover the
employer mandate which is having all employers offer health insurance that is affordable to at
least 95% of their employees. Having the treatment group be the self-employed was derived for a
couple reasons. The first being that the individual mandate does not affect individuals who are
already on Medicare, those who have obtained insurance through their employer, and individuals
that bought private insurance. The second reason is that this pool of Americans had the choice of
opting into a health insurance program once the mandate was implemented and also had a choice
to opt out once it was repealed. The group that was controlled in this analysis was those who
already have insurance. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the reported count of the
number of self-employed individuals in the US is 15 million in 2016. This paper extracted
2,406,723 self-employed individuals which is a decent percentage to represent the relative
overall population of the folk in the US.
The primary data for this policy evaluation comes from the Current Population Survey
(CPS), conducted annually by the Bureau of the Census.The variables that have been extracted
pertain to the number of individuals who are self-employed, those who are on medicare and get
their insurance privately and/or through their employer. The main policy evaluation methodology
will be utilizing Difference -In- Differences estimation strategy in Stata that exploits how the
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treated groups (self-employed) activity of purchasing and/or removing of health insurance was
implicated by the removal of the mandate at the end of 2017. The results of the policy
measurement indicated a 7% increase in insurance coverage after the removal of the mandate.
This is counterintuitive to the notion that a mandate would increase insurance coverage generally
but it actually increased coverage in the self-employed group when it was removed. Other results
drawn from the measurement indicated that every single self-employed individual in the dataset
had either a highschool diploma or higher educational attainment.
Literature Review
This paper focuses on just one aspect of the ACA which is the individual mandate.
Previous research on the effects of the mandate revolve around the notion of how it affects
premiums on the exchanges, and the labor market with regards to employment. In this section I
review papers that are closely related to these notions and how it could shine a light into the
conclusions that I make from the empirical model that is revealed in this paper.
A published paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research, revolves around one
specific policy implication in the ACA which is the individual mandate. This section reviews the
literature on the effects of the individual mandate with regards to taxpayers and the risk of
unemployment with certain demographics.
Architects of the Affordable Care Act have written numerous scholarly papers on the
matter that provide a detailed analysis of all parts of the law. Under the NBER, Molly Frean,
Jonathan Gruber and Benjamin D. Sommers wrote a paper called Premium Subsidies, The
Mandate, and Medicaid Expansion: Coverage Effects of the Affordable Care Act. The authors
take a step into looking at how the individual mandate affected coverage rates. The conclusion
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the authors have made in the abstract states that, “ The individual mandate’s exemptions and
penalties had little impact on coverage rates”(Gruber 1). The authors provide a more in depth
explanation of this by stating, “The mandate does not impact those who are exempted based on
their income, and due to other non-linearities in the mandate penalty amount, families may be
exposed to different potential levels of tax penalties in the event that they do not obtain health
insurance” (Gruber 17).
Gruber and his colleagues measured the conclusion by constructing an algorithm that
represents each family’s tax penalty in dollars due to the mandate utilizing the 2014 tax-filing
thresholds. The authors then placed families in specific mandate penalty exemption brackets
based on their income and saw that no one below 138% of FPL (Federal Poverty Level) in
non-expansion states is subject to the mandate, while in expansion states, the mandate takes
effect at the tax-filing threshold. With families that are in the highest income range, more than
90% of them are subject to the mandate with the average penalty adding up to $1000 per family.
It is worth mentioning that the authors provided a fact that in Massachuests, there has been
research that showed that there has been an increase in Medicaid participation after the mandate
was implemented. This tale leads to the question of the paper as to those who are self-employed
and are relatively well off because they own a business of sorts, choose to buy insurance or
rather just pay the penalty.
Katherine Baicker and Helen Levy wrote a paper called Employer Health Insurance
Mandates and the Risk of Unemployment that looks into the employer health insurance mandates
from the form of healthcare proposals like the ACA. Their study contributes to answering one
major question in their analysis which is, how much of an impact would a mandata implicate the
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risk of unemployment? Supporters of the mandate make the case that the mandates would
increase insurance, while opponents are more concerned with the fact that it offsets low wage
earners, thus experiencing unemployment with the presence of already low minimum wages.
Utilizing data from the Consumer Population Survey of gathering individuals data of wages,
health insurance and demographics; 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the
minimum wage, putting them at risk of unemployment if their employers were required to offer
insurance.
The authors also go under an assumption that the elasticity of employment with respect to
minimum wage, 0.2 percent of full-time workers and 1.4 percent of uninsured full-time workers
would lose their jobs because of the mandate. The authors categorize the demographic of the
workers that would lose their jobs are disproportionately likely to be high
school dropouts, minority, and female. The figure below is a table created by the authors that 1
illustrate the numbers associated with the group of individuals that are at risk of unemployment
with respect to the implementation of an insurance mandate.

Health Insurance Mandates and the Risk of Unemployment by Katherine
Baicker and Helen Levy
1

Figure from E
 mployer
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No research to this date to my knowledge, has studied the effect on the implementation of
the mandate with respect to self-employed workers as well as the overall significance it has after
the mandate was repealed.
The Kaiser Family Foundation published a paper written by Rabah Kamal, Cynthia Cox,
Rachel Fehr, Marco Ramirez, Katherine Horstman, and Larry Levitt explaining that the ACA
included a variety of “sticks” such as the individual mandate penalty and limited enrollment
opportunities. The paper reveals that “2019 premiums will be an average of 6% higher, as a
direct result of individual mandate repeal and expansion of more loosely regulated plans”
(Kamal 1). The data shown below is the data that the authors provided that illustrates the range
of the impacts on the premium distribution with regard to the removal of the mandate. This data
reveals that the percentages increase as the percentile goes up which implicates that those who
are in the 75th percentile see a major increase in their premiums. The authors noted that with the
combination of the individual mandate penalty repeal and cost-sharing subsidy, the on-exchange
silver premiums rose up 16% in 2019. Silver premiums are part of the Silver Health Plan under
the ACA, which is the middle ground of all the marketplace plans which constitutes to
individuals and families whose incomes are up to 250% of the poverty line.
The data gathered from KFF could potentially give reason as to individuals who are
self-employed and who are presumed to have higher income than that of 250% of the poverty
line, which could suggest that these individuals rather pay a tax penalty than a rising insurance
premium.
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Year of

Min

Filings

25th

Average

Percentile

75th

Max

Percentile

2019

0%

4%

6%

8%

16%

2018

0%

2%

5%

6%

25%

Data and Policy Measurement
The variables that have been extracted from IPUMS CPS Survey were typical
demographic information such as gender, race, education level and marital status. The variables
that were most helpful in conducting this policy measure is the class of the worker denoted in the
dataset as “classwkr” and individuals that have health insurance over the period from 2011-2018.
The variables that denote who has health insurance, come from multiple variables because many
individuals acquire insurance from either medicare, employer provided, private insurance and/or
2

group health insurance.
The raw data set with all variables implemented had a total in the amount of observations

at 3,771,897 individuals. To simplify the data in order to accurately reflect the impact of the
mandate, the ages below 16 and above 65 were removed from the set because anyone below 16
aren’t in the labor force and those above 65 are mostly out of the labor force with very few
exemptions which was still not considered in the policy measure. The average age after the
constraint was 40 years old. The educational attainment level was constrained to those that have
received a high school diploma or higher because through intuition, it is assumed that the target

Data from KFF “How Repeal of the Individual Mandate and Expansion of Loosely Regulated Plans are
Affecting 2019 Premiums”
2
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treatment group which is the self-employed have diploma or higher. This leads to the next point
in which when condescending the sample to self-employed individuals, all of them have received
at least a high school diploma or a higher degree which came out to be 2,406,723 individuals.
The control group of the policy measure was those that have health insurance which was
compiled from multiple variables in the dataset. The multiple variables were then merged
together into a new variable which is called “ins” and I made this the dependent variable for the
model. The self-employed folk was extracted from the class of worker variable and a new
variable was created called “selfemploy”. To construct the mandate measure, the diff-in-diff
estimations was created by creating a treat (self employ) and post variable (year after 2018) and
taking the product of the two and regressing it. The reason for utilizing a diff-in-diff for this
policy evaluation is the fact that it measures the variations overtime (time-series) and over
individuals (cross-sectional data).
Assumptions and Constraints
The underlying assumptions and constraints for this analysis are all based on what the
IPUMS CPS data on individuals provide. The model was constrained to only just a little over 3
million observations provided by the data set but was then simplified down to 164,766
observations for those that are self-employed. Individuals that are regarded as having health
insurance came out to be a bit over 2 million. The reason for this was the assumption that
individuals who are self-employed would be affected by the mandate as well avoid spurious
results. The data that was extracted from after 2017 (2018-2019) is relatively new data and there
is not much data compared to how much there was in previous years. This constraint would
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cause the results to be not as precise as it could be, if for example this model was created 2 years
from now when there's more data about insurance coverage in 2018 and 2019.
Results
The table below is the regression analysis along with the diff-in-diff component that
reflects the effect of the individual mandate withdrawal amongst individuals that are
self-employed. The diff-in-diff coefficient is at a 0.069 percentage point which can be rounded to
0.7 or 7%. This means that there is a 7 percentage point increase in insurance after the mandate
was removed. This is a thought-provoking result because it shines a light as to how the sample
group of the self-employed, around 7% of them, probably paid the penalty, excluding the other
factors that could have been involved. The variables treat (self-employ) and post (after 2018)
compare the changes in the outcome of the number of insured between the population of the treat
that is not in the “ins” variable and the population that is, (ins) the control group. The t-statistic
for “did” equals 35.74, and is statistically significant, meaning that the regression coefficient for
“did” is significantly different from zero.
The r-squared shows a 21.42% variation in the model which explains the proportion of
variance in the dependent variable (ins) that is explained by the independent variable which is
“did”. The adjusted r-squared value indicates that “treat”, “post” and “did” predict 21.42% of
the variation in values of “ins”. It is important to note that the r-squared and adjusted r-squared
values are the same which suggests that with the addition of more variables in the model, the
model itself is not becoming more explanatory. This model however provides an implication that
the policy of withdrawing the individual mandate did not fully enforce all individuals in the U.S
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labor whether self-employed or hired, to buy health insurance. It suggests that people were still
willing to pay the tax penalty in addition to the other taxes they would need to pay.

Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs= 2,406,723
F(3, 2406719) > 99999.00

Model

88578.8237 3

29559.6079

Prob > F = 0.0000

Residual

325348.829 2,406,719

0.135183555

R-Squared = 0.2142
Adj R-squared = 0.2142

Total

414027.653 2,406,722

0.172029695

Root MSE = .36767

ins

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

treat

-.0860718

.001553

-55.42

0.000

-.0891157

-.083028

post

-.4014851

.0005088

-789.13

0.000

-.4024823

-.4004879

did

.069663

.0019492

35.74

0.000

.0658427

.0734833

_cons

1.47693

.000404

3655.65

0.000

1.476138

1.477722

Areas of Further Study
The study of the healthcare system is a complex manner in which there are many
different mechanics that would tailor to each and every single American. The Affordable Care
Act’s fate of whether it would still be a law in the future would be determined by future
Presidents as well as their vision of a robust healthcare system. Many progressive ideas such as
Medicare for all have been rigorously studied but would the same effects from this paper
contribute to a Medicare for all? One area of study could be looking at if an individual mandate
affected individuals who worked part-time but make an income close to the threshold that the
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mandate would be in effect. By looking at this, there could possibly be a group of individuals in
the labor force that are worse off from the mandate than before.
Conclusion
Based on the results of the regression analysis and the diff-in-diff, the withdrawal of the
individual mandate created a counter-intuitive result where insurance for those that are
self-employed actually increased after 2018. The whole basis of the individual mandate was to
incentivise individuals into opting into a health insurance program, especially for those that do
not receive insurance from their providers like the self-employed. Adverse selection into the
healthcare exchanges can somewhat mitigate the overall demand for insurance since the
implementation of the mandate because of the subsidies in the exchanges and the open
enrollment period. This caveat shows that the model this paper has presented can also have other
factors that would lead to an increase in insurance from self-employers after the mandate was
repealed, not just the mandate itself. In part, this may indicate that the policy implicated a
minimal impact onto the self-employed. The Affordable Care Act provided a mechanism in
which taxpayers in the US must obtain insurance and are only incentivised to do so because of
the tax penalty they could face. Self-employers in the U.S also have the option of providing
employer based insurance to its employees which comes at a cost to not only the business but
also the employer themselves.
Since the data was constrained to self-employed individuals that have at least a
highschool diploma or higher degree, this would suggest that these individuals hold businesses in
sectors that would pay them more (i.e law firms, chiropractors, finance, doctors). The Bureau of
Labor Statistics calculated that the median income for self-employers in occupations that require
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at least a highschool diploma was greater than $60,000. This suggests that self-employers rather
pay out of pocket for insurance and submit themselves to the penalty, or these workers are
healthy overall. This paper reflects how the individual mandate can still create motivations for
self-employers to not buy health insurance bur do so after the repeal at the end of 2017.
With the results of the empirical model in terms of self-employers being affected by the
withdrawal of the mandate, there are some policy measures that are worth considering. The first
consideration would be to systematically incentivise everyone in the U.S to obtain health
insurance regardless through private or government, through the means of allowing workers to
receive a tax exemption in a certain tax code. Rather than instigating a tax penalty, I believe a
positive mechanism of rewarding tax payers would lead more people to buy into either Medicare,
Medicard or other health insurance programs. This would be costly however, but more people
would enroll in government funded health insurance and Congress could then worry about
appropriations in order to sustain this policy.
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